For Better or Worse: The 1988 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code by Sottosanti, Carl
Volume 34 Issue 3 Article 15 
1989 
For Better or Worse: The 1988 Amendments to the Pennsylvania 
Divorce Code 
Carl Sottosanti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carl Sottosanti, For Better or Worse: The 1988 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 34 Vill. L. 
Rev. 715 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1989]
FOR BETTER OR WORSE: THE 1988 AMENDMENTS TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the bulk of the Com-
monwealth's present Divorce Code (1980 Code).' The 1980 Code was
intended to modernize Pennsylvania's domestic relations law and har-
monize it with the law of other states.2 On February 12, 1988, Governor
Casey signed into law Senate Bill 4093 which amended the 1980 Code in
a number of substantive respects. These amendments ("1988 Amend-
ments"), which were in some cases legislative reactions to court deci-
sions interpreting the 1980 Code, will have far-reaching effects on the
domestic relations practice in Pennsylvania. 4 The purposes of this arti-
cle are to enumerate and explain the 1988 Amendments; discuss the ra-
tionale behind the amendments and the case law which culminated in
their enactment; and where applicable, analyze the impact of the amend-
ments on the Pennsylvania domestic relations practice. This article will
catalogue the bulk of the changes made by the 1988 Amendments with
special emphasis on: 1) the additional factors considered in the determi-
nation of alimony, 5 2) the additional factors considered in the determi-
nation of equitable distribution,6 3) the valuation of marital assets, 7
1. Divorce Code, Pub. L. No. 63-26 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§§ 101-801 (Purdon Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 1980 DIVORCE CODE], amended b "
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 101-801 (Purdon Supp. 1989) [hereinafter 1988 DI-
VORCE CODE]). The 1980 Code made drastic changes in the prior law including
the addition of equitable distribution, post-divorce alimony, and no-fault di-
vorce. See Raphael, Family Law, PA. B.A.Q 1 (Jan. 1989).
2. See generally Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 25
VILL. L. REV. 617 (1979-80); Comment, Divorce Reform: Pemsylvania Attempts to
Break with the Past, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 877 (1980).
3. S. 409, 172d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51 (Purdon). For a
summary of the legislative history of the Bill, see Howett, Commentary to THE
DIVORCE CODE: AMENDMENTS OF FEBRUARY 12, 1988, at iv, 1 (Pa. B. Inst. 1988)
[hereinafter PBI, 1988 Amendments].
4. The effects of the 1988 Amendments will also be felt in areas ancillary to
the domestic relations practice. For instance, the amendments will have an ef-
fect on real estate practitioners. See, e.g., 1988 DIVORCE CODE, spra note 1,
§ 403(d) (some encumbrances and transfers of marital property may be deemed
fraudulent, thus null and void). The amendments will also affect probate prac-
tice. See, e.g., id. §§ 401(b.1), 508 (upon death of one party after divorce decree
has been entered, action continues with personal representative of deceased
substituted as party). For a further discussion of this change, see infra notes
140-42 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the factors used in the determination of alimony, see
infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the impact of the 1988 Amendments on the factors
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A number of changes were made in the definitional section of the
Divorce Code.' 0 The major definitional change in the 1988 Amend-
ments is the legislative expansion of the term "separate and apart."'I
The term "separate and apart" is significant as an independent ground
for divorce. In Pennsylvania, a unilateral no-fault divorce may be
granted if the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of at
least two years and the marriage is irretrievably broken. 12 The new defi-
nition codifies case law which held that parties could reside under the
same roof, and still be "separate and apart," if all cohabitation had
ceased, for purposes of meeting the grounds necessary for a divorce.' 3
The effect of this expanded definition is that parties will no longer be
required to undergo the economic hardship that comes with occupying
separate households in order to obtain a non-consensual no-fault di-
vorce. 14 This change confirms the Pennsylvania legislature's commit-
ment to making divorce law an effective tool for dealing with the realities
7. For a discussion of how the 1988 Amendments deal with the valuation
and determination of marital assets, see infra notes 70-84, 117 and accompany-
ing text.
8. For a discussion of the 1988 Amendments' impact upon the effect of sep-
aration agreements between parties, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying
text.
9. For a discussion of the 1988 Amendments' impact upon the duration of
alimony, see infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
10. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 104. A relatively minor change was
made by defining the term "spousal support." This term is now defined as
"[c]are, maintenance, and financial assistance." Id. For a discussion of the im-
pact of this change, see PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 4.
11. See 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 104. "Separate and apart" is
now defined as "[c]omplete cessation of any and all cohabitation whether living
in the same residence or not." Id. The definition of separate and apart in the
1980 Code did not allow the parties to live in the same residence.
12. Id. § 201(d)(1).
13. See Mackey v. Mackey, 376 Pa. Super. 146, 154, 545 A.2d 362, 365
(1988) (party should not be forced to vacate home to demonstrate intent to live
separate and apart). The leading case which foreshadowed the amended defini-
tion of "separate and apart" is Flynn v. Flynn, 341 Pa. Super. 76, 491 A.2d 156
(1985). The Flynn court decided that the essential element is "separate lives not
separate roofs." Id. at 81, 491 A.2d at 159 (relying on reasoning of Meverl v.
Meyerl, 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 729 (1981) and Amelio v. Amelio, 18 Pa. D. k C.3d
673 (1981)). See also Biler v. Biler, 353 Pa. Super. 49, 51-52, 508 A.2d 1261,
1263 (1986) (adopting Flynn's definition and its rationale). For an application of
the "separate and apart" language, see 1988 DIVORCE CODE, spra note 1,
§ 201(d)(l) (non-consensual no-fault provision).
14. See Flynn, 341 Pa. Super. at 81, 491 A.2d at 159.
[Vol. 34: p. 715
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of marriage. 15 Since estranged spouses can now live under the same
roof and be considered "separate and apart," it is more important than
ever for spouses to avoid potential confusion by clearly manifesting their
intent to dissolve the marital relationship. This act will then allow the
clock to run on the "separate and apart" time requirement and thereby
avoid any later controversy. 16
B. Dissolution of the Marital Status
The next set of changes is embodied in Chapter Two of the Divorce
Code, hich deals with dissolution of the marital status. Under both the
1980 Code and the 1988 Code, one of the first steps in obtaining a non-
consensual no-fault divorce is to file a complaint stating the grounds for
a divorce. 17 Under the 1980 Code, most practitioners who intended to
file for a no-fault divorce on behalf of their clients merely included an
allegation in the complaint that the marriage was irretrievably broken.' 8
Then, after the applicable waiting period had passed, the practicioner
had to file an affadavit alleging that the couple had been separated for
the statutory separation period' 9 as well as an amended complaint con-
taining the same new information. 20 Section 201 (d)(1) now eliminates
the need to file an amended complaint and authorizes a mere allegation
of irretrievable breakdown in the complaint even though the relevant
separation period has yet to take place. 2 ' This change was prompted by
15. This commitment is embodied in the legislative intent section. See 1988
DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102(a)(1). The legislature declared it to be the
policy of the Commonwealth to "[miake the law for legal dissolution of marriage
effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience." Id.
16. See Sinha v. Sinha, 515 Pa. 14, 18-19, 526 A.2d 765, 767 (1987) (to
prevent ripening of surprise divorces, spouse must clearly manifest intent to dis-
solve marriage to other spouse before they can begin living separate and apart).
17. The grounds for a divorce are found at 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note
1, § 201. For a discussion of the applicable procedure and relevant forms, see 2
J. ROUNICK, PENNSYLVANIA MATRIMONIAL PRACTICE § 48:1 (1988).
18. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 6.
19. Id. The separation period for a non-consensual divorce has been short-
ened from three years to two years. For a further discussion of this change, see
infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
20. See Creach v. Creach, 361 Pa. Super. 482, 522 A.2d 1133 (1987) (both
complaint and affidavit must contain allegation of three-year separation for
court to grant legally enforceable divorce); Goditus v. Goditus, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d
271 (1983). See also 24 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2d, § 126:197 (Law.
Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (discussing application of § 201(d) of the 1980
Code).
21. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(d)(l). The change codified the
decision in Hepp v. Hepp, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 80 (1981) (section 201(d) merely
requires that affidavit and complaint contain statutory information when read
together). The language of § 201(d)(1) now reads: "It shall be lawful for the
court to grant a divorce where a complaint has been filed alleging that the mar-
riage is irretrievably broken and an affidavit has been filed alleging that the par-
ties have lived separate and apart [for two years] ...... 1988 DIVORCE CODE,
supra note 1, § 201(d)(1).
3
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several decisions that interpreted the old section 201(d)(1) in an overly
mechanical way. 2'2 The rationale behind one of these decisions was that
the legislature "has not seen fit" to amend the technical requirements of
section 201(d)(1). 2  Eliminating the additional requirement of an
amended complaint will save litigants time and money, and thus will
likely be well-received by the general public.2 4
In perhaps the most publicized of the amendments, the waiting pe-
riod for a non-consensual no-fault divorce was reduced from three years
to two years. 2 5 The shortened waiting period brings Pennsylvania
closer to the average waiting period in neighboring states. 265 Since the
parties to a divorce will now have less time to reconcile the financial
aspects of their marriage, 27 more petitions for bifurcation will likely be
filed.2-8
A new subsection has been added to section 201 which provides
that if the grounds for a consensual or non-consensual no-fault divorce
have been established, the court shall grant the divorce without requir-
ing a hearing on any other grounds.29 As with several of the new sec-
tions, this section responds specifically to a judicial interpretation based
on "an absence of legislative pronouncement."'3 0 Precluding a hearing
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. Creach, 361 Pa. Super. at 487, 522 A.2d at 1136. Decisions such as
Creach convinced the legislature to do away with the technical requirements of
§ 201 (d).
24. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 6.
25. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(d)(l). Although the 1988
Amendments became effective immediately, the reduced time period for di-
vorces only applies to final separations beginning after the effective date. S. 409,
172d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51, 59 (Purdon).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1503, 1505 (1981) (separation, in
context of divorce grounds, defined as separate and apart for six months or
more); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2.d (West 1987) (eighteen-month waiting period
for contested no-fault divorce); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988)
(one-year waiting period for contested no-fault divorce).
27. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing effects of shorter
waiting period).
28. See 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401 (b. 1). Section 401 (b. 1) pro-
vides the authority for bifurcated decrees: "In the event that the court is unable
for any reason to determine and dispose [of economic matters] ... it may enter a
decree of divorce or annulment." Id. Bifurcated proceedings allow parties to
quickly sever their marital ties even though litigation continues as to the disposi-
tion of marital property or alimony. See Wolk v. Wolk, 318 Pa. Super. 311, 464
A.2d 1359 (1983) (referring to definition of bifurcation under § 401(b) of Di-
vorce Code, economic claims may be severed from divorce claim). The proce-
dural rule necessary to implement bifurcation is PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.52(c), 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987) ("The court need not determine all claims at
one time but may enter a decree adjudicating a specific claim or claims."). For a
further discussion of bifurcation, see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
29. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note l, § 201(e).
30. See Restifo v. Restifo, 339 Pa. Super. 352, 357, 489 A.2d 196, 199
(1985) (despite allegation and establishment of no-fault grounds, court must
also consider fault grounds).
718 [Vol. 34: p. 715
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on fault grounds when sufficient grounds for a no-fault divorce have
been admitted or established will speed up the divorce process in many
cases and thus reduce docket congestion in the Pennsylvania family
courts. Additionally, prohibiting a hearing on fault grounds will allevi-
ate some of the emotional harm to the family which results from the
marital dissolution. 3' Because of this subsection, a litigant's private af-
fairs will no longer necessarily be exposed to the publicity that comes
with judicial scrutiny of fault grounds.3 2 However, this amendment is
difficult to reconcile with case law granting a defendant the power to
defend a divorce as well as to attempt to secure a divorce on separate
and distinct grounds. 33
C. Procedural Changes
1. Divisible Divorce
Another part of the Divorce Code that has undergone important
changes is Chapter Three, which deals with procedural matters. Section
301(c) 34 codifies and expands the doctrine of "divisible divorce." Divis-
ible divorce is possible when a divorce decree obtained in another state
fails to address the economic questions involved in the dissolution of a
marriage, and leaves these questions open for determination in other
jurisdictions. 3 5
In the 1980 Code, divisible divorce was addressed by section 505.'
This section proved inadequate because it allowed a dependent spouse
who had obtained a foreign divorce decree to petition the Pennsylvania
31. See Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 510-11, 439 A.2d 683, 692-
93 (1981) (dissolution of marriage should take place in way which emphasizes
future welfare of family instead of attempting to identify and punish guilty par-
ties); see also 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102(a)(4) (legislative intent is
to mitigate harm to spouses and children caused by dissolution of marriage).
32. But see 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(14). Section
501(b) (14) makes marital misconduct by either party during the marriage a fac-
tor for consideration in determining alimony. Id. Thus a litigant's private affairs
may still be exposed to some extent under this section.
33. See Ford v. Ford, 291 Pa. Super. 381, 383-84, 435 A.2d 1278, 1279
(1981). In Ford, the court held that in the same action each party has the right to
defend a divorce action and to secure a divorce in his or her favor for separate
and distinct reasons. Id. It appears that § 201(e) of the 1988 Amendments im-
pliedly overrules the latter holding of Ford. Now, if no-fault grounds can be
established, the court will grant a divorce without a hearing on any other
grounds. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 201(e).
34. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 301(c).
35. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (Nevada divorce decree and
alimony order not necessarily dispositive of economic aspects of divorce; thus,
New York judgment establishing alimony did not deny lull faith and credit to
Nevada decree); Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974) (ex
parte Florida divorce decree entitled to full faith and credit, but question of ali-
mony could still be raised in Pennsylvania since Florida court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over one party).
36. See 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 505.
1989] 719
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court for alimony but not for equitable distribution.3 7 In contrast, sec-
tion 301(c) now provides comprehensive protection for every economic
or custody issue not dealt with in a foreign decree.""
Section 505 of the 1980 Code also restricted the Pennsylvania
courts by allowing economic relief only when the foreign divorce decree
was ex parte..3 9 Section 301(c) eliminates the prerequisite of an ex parte
foreign divorce decree before a Pennsylvania court may adjudicate the
economic matters left open by the foreign decree.40 In place of the ex
parte language,4 1 section 301(c) now allows Pennsylvania courts to de-
cide economic matters left open by a foreign divorce decree "to the ful-
lest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States. '" 4 2 A
common situation in which the ex parte requirement of section 505 cre-
ated problems was where both parties appeared at a foreign forum yet
the foreign forum decided that a Pennsylvania court would be better
suited to determine whatever economic matters were in dispute. 4 3
Under section 505, a Pennsylvania court could not handle the undecided
economic questions in this situation. 4 4 Under section 301(c), which
37. Section 505 of the 1980 Code allowed a party to obtain alimony from a
Pennsylvania court if there was an exparte divorce decree in another jurisdiction.
Id. But because of the existence of § 401(d), which allows a court to provide
equitable distribution only after that court has proceeded with a divorce decree,
a "victim" of an ex parte divorce in another jurisdiction could only turn to the
Pennsylvania courts for help in obtaining alimony, not for equitable distribution.
For an example of such a situation, see Frisch v. Frisch, 36 Pa. D. & C.3d 220
(1985) (spouse who is resident of Pennsylvania and defendant or respondent in
foreign ex parte action for divorce may petition court for alimony, but not for
equitable distribution).
38. Section 301(c) allows courts to award spousal support, alimony, ali-
monypendente lite, counsel fees, costs, custody, visitation, child support and equi-
table distribution in cases of a foreign exparte decree. See 1988 DIvoRcE CODE,
supra note 1, § 301(c).
39. 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 505.
40. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 301(c). The prerequisite of an ex
parte decree found in the 1980 Code was generally accepted by Pennsylvania
courts. See Sohmer v. Sohmer, 318 Pa. Super. 500, 506, 465 A.2d 665, 668
(1983) (doctrine of divisible divorce is limited in cases of foreign, ex parte di-
vorces); Jarrin v. Jarrin, 37 Pa. D. & C.3d 522, 525 (1985) (same).
41. 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 505.
42. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 301(c). This section now permits
"protection for any issue which could have been raised under § 301(a) but was
not dealt with in the foreign forum." PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 12.
43. See, e.g., Sohmer, 318 Pa. Super. at 503 n.1, 465 A.2d at 666 n.l. In Soh-
mer the Virginia court specifically stated that its divorce decree shall not affect
the power of other states to adjudicate economic matters. Id. Despite this reser-
vation ofjurisdiction for other courts, the inflexibility of § 505 of the 1980 Code
prevented the Pennsylvania court from adjudicating economic issues since the
divorce was technically not ex parte. Id. at 506-07, 465 A.2d at 668.
44. Consequently, Pennsylvania courts began to see the drawbacks of the
"ex parte" language and began to chip away at these restrictions found in the
language of § 505 of the 1980 Code. See, e.g., Cheng v. Cheng, 347 Pa. Super.
515, 500 A.2d 1175 (1985). In Cheng, the South Carolina court specifically con-
ditioned its divorce decree on the parties' agreement to resolve economic issues
720 [Vol. 34: p. 715
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does not contain the ex parte restriction, a Pennsylvania court can now
decide these questions. Thus, Pennsylvania courts now have more flexi-
bility in dealing with economic aspects of a divorce and can provide
greater economic protection than was possible under section 505.
2. Venue
Section 301(d)4 5 is a new section that is designed to specify the
proper county in which to bring a divorce or annulment proceeding.
This section provides different venue options that depend on the time of
filing.4 6 The rationale behind these new venue restrictions is to prevent
divorce mills and mail-order divorces in counties where filing fees and
costs are comparatively low, but where neither party can claim a suffi-
cient residential connection for proper venue.4 7 This is a laudable ob-
jective, but its attainment is questionable in light of the confusion
surrounding the issue of whether a venue objection can be waived. 48
in Pennsylvania. Id. at 524, 500 A.2d at 1180. Since both parties appeared in
the South Carolina action, the decree was not ex parte. However, the Cheng court
did not allow this to prevent a Pennsylvania court from deciding economic is-
sues. Instead, the Cheng court severely stretched the definition of ex parte so that
the lower court could adjudicate the economic matters. Id. at 526, 500 A.2d at
1181.
45. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 301(d).
46. The old venue provision allowed an action to be brought only in the
county in which the plaintiff or the defendant resided. PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.2, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987). Section 301(d) of the 1988 Code now
provides that after the first six months following the final separation date, a di-
vorce or annulment proceeding may be brought in the county where either party
resides. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 301(d). During the first six months
following final separation, several venue options are possible. During this lpe-
riod, venue is proper in: a) the county of the defendant's residence; or b) if the
defendant resides outside of Pennsylvania, the county of plaintiff's residence; or
c) the county where the plaintiff resides if that is the county where the plaintiff
has continuously resided and is the county of matrimonial domicile; or d) the
county of the plaintiff's residence, even if the plaintiff no longer resides in the
county of matrimonial domicile, if the defendant consents. Id. See also PBI, 1988
Amendments, supra note 3, at 13.
47. Cassel, Amendments to the Divorce Act, BARRISTER, Summer 1988, at 29.
The new venue provision is an attempt by the legislature to offer enough legiti-
mate venue options so that people will not be tempted to break the venue rules.
48. A memorandum circulated to all President Judges by the Court Admin-
istrator of Pennsylvania stated: "[T]he courts of common pleas are directed to
require strict compliance with [the venue rulesi." See PA. R. C. P. 1920.2, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987) (introductory note). It is unclear whether
this memorandum simply stresses greater compliance with the venue rules or
whether it seeks to eliminate waiver of the venue provisions. Several lower court
cases looked to this memorandum for authoritv and held dat venue reqtire-
ments cannot be waived. See Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 30 Pa. 1). & C.3d 638
(1984); Bradley v. Bradley, 28 Pa. 1). & C.3d 351 (1983). Prior to these cases
and the isstiance of tie nemorandum, the Superior Court had held that ventie
objections were waivable. See Gogets v. Gogets, 267 Pa. Super. 458, 402 A.2d
1132 (1979); Hohlstein v. Hohlstcin, 223 Pa. Super. 348, 296 A.2d 886 (1972).
Until Pennsylvania's appellate courts rule on the question of whether the venue
7
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Chapter Four, dealing primarily with property rights, contains the
bulk of the new legislation. Former section 401 (b) has been divided into
two parts: section 401(b) and section 401(b.1). Section 401(b.1) 4 9 is
now the provision that authorizes the right to a bifurcated decree.5Y
This section now provides more protection for a spouse in the interim
between a divorce decree and a final settlement of economic matters by
allowing a court to award counsel fees and costs, 5 1 and alimony pendente
lite.52 Courts also now have the power to make temporary orders that
are necessary to protect the parties pending final disposition. 5 3 By at-
tempting to alleviate the possible economic disadvantages endured by a
dependent spouse, these protective measures make bifurcation less use-
ful as a dilatory tactic.
5 4
Section 401 (b. 1) 55 of the 1988 Amendments also attempts to allevi-
ate the inequities that previously existed when a non-dependent party to
requirements of the 1988 Amendments can be waived by the parties, strict en-
forcement of these provisions cannot be guaranteed.
49. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(b.1).
50. Id. Previously the right to a bifurcated decree was provided by PA. R.
Civ. P. 1920.52(c), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987). See Wolk v. Wolk,
318 Pa. Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1983) (economic claims may be severed or
bifurcated from divorce claims under 1980 Code and thus tried separately). The
bifurcation provision enables parties to avoid the hardship of having to wait for
marital dissolution until all economic disputes are settled.
51. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(b.1).
52. Id. Alimony pendente lite is awarded to sustain the dependent spouse ol
an equal basis with the other spouse while maintaining or defending the divorce
action. See McNulty v. McNulty, 347 Pa. Super. 363, 500 A.2d 876 (1985). In
contrast, the purpose of spousal support is to assure a reasonable living allow-
ance to the dependent party. This duty arises out of the marital relationship and
terminates when the marriage ends. See Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa. Super. 23,
35, 456 A.2d 163, 169 (1983). Pennsylvania law is not completely settled on
distinguishing between spousal support and alimonypendenwe lite. Compare Levine
v. Levine, 360 Pa. Super. 297, 302-03, 520 A.2d 466, 468 (1987) (spousal sup-
port and alimony peudenfe lite are distinct because upon entry of bifurcated de-
cree, spousal support must be terminated while payments in form of alimony
pendente lite may continue) with Ritter v. Ritter, 359 Pa. Super. 12, 16, 518 A.2d
319, 321 (1986) (spousal support and alimony pendenfe lite are indistinguishable).
53. 1988 DIVoRcE CODE, supra note !, § 401 (b. 1). This power is similar to
the general grant of equitable powers given to courts in the 1980 Code. See
1980 )IVORCE CODE, supra note i, § 401(c); see also id. § 403 (authorizing Court
to issue injunctions against disposition of property pending suit). For an cxan-
ple of a court's power to enter an injunction to protect a party's right to the
economic settlement related to a divorce action, see Lazovitz v. lazovitz, 307 Pa.
Super. 341, 453 A.2d 615 (1982).
54. This protection becomes especially important if, as expected, § 201(d)
of the 1988 Code creates more occasions for the use of bifurcated decrees. For
a discussion of § 201(d) of the 1988 Code and its cf'ect on bifurcated decrees,
see sipra notes 25-28 and accompanying texi.
55. 1988 )IVORCE CmOlE, supra note i, § 401(b.I).
[Vol. 34: p. 715
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the divorce proceeding died after a divorce decree was granted but
before the court's final decision on economic matters had been ren-
dered. Since a divorce decree ends all marital ties, the dependent
spouse would forfeit any claim to the statutory share of the decedent
spouse's estate. 56 In addition, it is commonplace for all "marital" prop-
erty to be titled in the decedent spouse's name. In this situation under
prior law, a surviving spouse was left in the frightening position of hav-
ing no joint property, no inheritance, and no economic settlement aris-
ing out of the divorce. Recently, Pennsylvania courts have agreed that
once a divorce decree has been entered, a surviving spouse's economic
claims are vested.5 7 The Pennsylvania legislature clearly approved of
this line of cases; under section 401(b.1), a personal representative is
substituted for the decedent spouse and the property allocation portion
of the action continues. 58
2. The Determination of Equitable Distribution
Important changes were made to section 401(d) of the 1980 Code.
Section 401(d) 59 of the 1988 Code sets out a non-exclusive list of the
factors to be considered in the distribution of marital property.51 A
56. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2202, 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1989) (right
of election for surviving spouse to take statutory share only available if decedent
was married at time of death).
57. See Pastuszek v. Pastuszek, 346 Pa. Super. 416, 426, 499 A.2d 1069,
1074 (1985) (once divorce decree is granted, court may continue with equitable
distribution of marital property, despite death of one party). Accord Drumheller
v. Marcello, 516 Pa. 428, 432, 532 A.2d 807, 808-09 (1987) (citing PastusZek with
approval). If, however, a spouse dies before a divorce decree is granted, the ac-
tion will not continue. See Haviland v. Haviland, 333 Pa. Super. 162, 165. 481
A.2d 1355, 1357 (1984) (pending divorce action abates upon death of one of
spouses prior to entry of divorce decree). Additionally, the death of one spouse
does not destroy the efficacy of a predivorce equitable distribution decree. See
Reese v. Reese, 351 Pa. Super. 521, 506 A.2d 471 (1986). Section 401 (b.l) does
not change these results.
58. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(b.1). For the provision ad-
dressing the powers of a personal representative, see 20 PA. CONS. STr. ANN.
§ 3311 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1989).
59. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, sipra note 1, § 401(d).
60. See id. The statute provides that the court should consider the following
factors:
(1) The length of the marriage;
(2) Any prior marriage of either party;
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties;
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or il-
creased earning power OIt the other part':
(5) The opportunity of each party for fture acquisitions of capital as-
sets and income:
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to
medical, retirement, insurance or other benelits:
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each parly in the acquisition,
1989] 723
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court may now authorize a distribution "in kind or otherwise,"'6 mean-
ing that a buy-out is now a potential alternative to the traditional distri-
bution scheme. 62 This amended language manifests the legislature's
disapproval of case law that rigidly interpreted the statutory distribution
procedure by unduly restricting buy-outs of marital assets.6"3
Two significant items were added to the list of factors that are used
to determine equitable distribution. Under the new rules, tax ramifica-
tions will be considered when examining the economic circumstances of
each party. 64 Additionally, courts may now consider whether the parent
has custody of the children in computing equitable distribution.6 5 This
latter amendment appears unnecessary and redundant in light of the
preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property in-
cluding the contribution of a party as homemaker;
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party;
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(10) The economic circumstances of each party, including federal,
state, and local tax ramifications, at the time the division of property is
to become effective;
(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any depen-
dent minor children.
Id. See also Semasek v. Semasek, 331 Pa. Super. 1, 11, 479 A.2d 1047, 1052(1984) (list of factors for consideration in determination of equitable distribu-
tion is not exclusive), rev'd on other grounds, 509 Pa. 282, 502 A.2d 109 (1985).
The relative weight given to these factors is up to the discretion of the trial
court. See, e.g., Sergi v. Sergi, 351 Pa. Super. 588, 599-600, 506 A.2d 928, 934
(1986).
61. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(d).
62. Id. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 20. A buy-out occurs
when a court allows one spouse to pay the cash value of the equitable distribu-
tion award to the other spouse, instead of having to relinquish the property
awarded in kind. See, e.g., Barletta v. Barletta, 506 Pa. 404, 408-09, 485 A.2d
752, 754 (1984).
63. See Barletta, 506 Pa. at 408-09, 485 A.2d at 754. In Barletta, the court
held that although the remedy of a "buy-out" is not prohibited, it may be an
abuse of discretion where the marital property is readily severable. Id. Thus,
the court imposed a set of restrictions on a court's ability to grant a buy-out
remedy. The Barletta court gave a very literal interpretation to § 401 (d) of the
1980 Code which provided that a "court shall, upon request of either party,
equitably divide, distribute, or assign the marital property." 1980 DIVORCE
CODE, supra note 1, § 401(d). Presumably, § 401(d) of the 1988 Code allows the
remedy of a buy-out without the restrictions imposed by the Barletta court.
64. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401 (d)(10). This provision codifies
the decision of Diamond v. Diamond, 360 Pa. Super. 10 1, 114, 519 A.2d 1012,
1018-19 (1987) (fairness dictates that impact of' tax laws be accotnted for in
determination of equitable distribution).
65. 1988 )IVORCE COID, sIAp/a note I, § 401 (d)( 11) (court mav consider
"w]hether the party will be serving as custodian of any dependent minor chil-
dren"). This provision reverses the decision of Bold v. Bold, 358 Pa. Super. 7,
11-12, 516 A.2d 741, 743 (1986) (custody of minor children should not have
effect on equitable distribution because needs of custodial parent adequately ad-
dressed by support proceedings).
[Vol. 34: p. 715
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availability of child support and alimony. 6 6 The legislature may have
intended for courts to apply this factor to the manner of distribution, by
giving possession or use of the marital home to the custodial parent,
rather than increasing the custodial parent's share of the marital pro-
ceeds.157 In any event, genuine concern exists that unscrupulous parents
will now be encouraged to enter into custody litigation simply to gain an
edge in equitable distribution. 68 Another concern raised by the amend-
ment is that consideration of the custody of "any" minor children, in-
stead of just children of the instant marriage, is an overly broad and
unfair standard.6 9
3. Marital Property
Section 401(e)70 of the 1988 Amendments has drastically changed
the definition of "marital property"-that is, property subject to equita-
ble distribution. Marital property now includes two categories: prop-
erty acquired by either party during marriage 7 1 and the increase in the
value of certain non-marital property which occurs prior to final separa-
tion. 72 The latter category now includes any increase in the value of
property acquired prior to marriage. 7 3 The 1988 Code does not directly
66. Support payments are provided for in 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note
1, § 504. Additionally, the 1988 Code now allows courts to consider child cus-
tody as a factor in determining alimony. Id. § 501(b)(7). These two provisions
would seem to provide adequate funds from which a custodial parent could sup-
port a child.
67. PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 21. The power to award one of
the parties the use of the marital residence existed in the 1980 Code and re-
mains unchanged in the 1988 Code. See 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1,
§ 401(h). For an application of § 401(h), see Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa.
Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985).
68. PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 21.
69. Although it is difficult to argue that the child of a later or prior marriage
is less entitled to support than a child of the marriage in question, it seems un-
fair that a prior spouse should be burdened with supporting someone else's
child. This view can be supported by the legislative findings which state that it is
the policy of the Commonwealth to "[mlitigate the harm to the spouses and their
children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage." 1988 DIVORCE CODE,
supra note 1, § 102(4) (emphasis added). Support for the proposition that "their
children" refers to children of parties to the instant proceeding can be found in
PBI, 1988 Amendments, spra note 3, at 22.
70. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note I, § 401(e).
71. Id. For the exceptions to this general rule, see id. § 401(e)(1)(8). See
also Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. 378, 384, 543 A.2d 534, 537-38 (1988) (presump-
tion that property acquired during marriage was marital property can be rebut-
ted by preponderance of evidence).
72. 1988 )IVORCE CODE, stUpr note I, § 401 (e)(1), (3). This non-marital
property includes: I) property acquired prior to marriage or property acquired
in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage; and 2) property acquired
by bequest, devise, or descent, except between spouses. Id.
73. Id. § 401(e). c/: Ruddv. Rudd, 25 Pa. 1). & C.3d 699, 703 (1982) (court
refused to consider increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage as
marital property because this type of property was not expressly enumerated in
1989] 725
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address what "increase" in Value means,7 4 but it does clarify that the
cutoff date for when the increase in value of non-marital assets ceases to
be considered marital property is the date of final separation. -7 5
Another significant change is that gifts between spouses are now
included in the definition of marital property. 7" This change may lead
to the anomalous situation where property that is classified as non-mari-
tal or separate because it was acquired prior to marriage or in exchange
for property acquired prior to marriage will be rendered marital because
it was the object of an interspousal gift. 77 This apparent unfairness is
rectified in part by section 401(d)(7) 78 of the 1988 Amendments which
takes into account a spouse's contribution in the acquisition of marital
§ 401(e)(1), (3) of 1980 Code). Another Pennsylvania court used a less rigid
interpretation of § 401(e) of the 1980 Code and allowed any accretion in the
value of property acquired before marriage to be characterized as marital prop-
erty. Anthony v. Anthony, 355 Pa. Super. 589, 595, 514 A.2d 91, 94 (1986).
74. Prior to the enactment of the 1988 Amendments, a major controversy
existed regarding the definition of "increase"-that is, whether an inflationary
appreciation would be considered an "increase in value" under the 1980 Code.
See Anthony, 355 Pa. Super. at 597, 514 A.2d at 95 (holding that inflationary in-
crease in value is included in accretion treated as marital property). Controversy
also existed as to whether the increase in value should be split if the increase is
achieved primarily through the efforts of one spouse. See Johnson v. Johnson,
365 Pa. Super. 409, 414, 529 A.2d 1123, 1125 (1987) (trial court has power to
consider effect of one spouse's contribution to increase in value under
§ 401(d)(7) of 1980 Code). Presumably, these cases are still valid law and must
be applied when interpreting "increase" in value.
75. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401 (e). Section 401(e) of the 1980
Code set no cutoff date, but simply referred to the "increase in value during the
marriage." 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(e)(l). See Sutliffv. Sutliff,
518 Pa. 378, 384, 543 A.2d 534, 537 (1988) (proper date for valuation of marital
assets is distribution date); Anthony, 355 Pa. Super. at 595, 514 A.2d at 94 (two
choices for cut-off date are time of separation or time of divorce). The 1988
Amendments codify one of the Anthony alternatives and follow Sotlff by referring
to "final separation" as the cutoff date. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1,
§ 401 (e).
76. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(e)(3). In effect, the legislature
adopted a Superior Court opinion which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
summarily dismissed. See Semasek v. Semasek, 331 Pa. Super. 1, 7, 479 A.2d
1047, 1050 (1984) (interspousal gifts classified as marital property), ret'd, 509
Pa. 282, 287, 502 A.2d 109, 111 (1985) (citing Sorbello v. Sorbello, 21 Pa. D. &
C.3d 187 (1981)).
77. PBI, 1988,4mendinents, supra note 3, at 23 (citing Brown v. Brown, 352
Pa. Super. 267, 507 A.2d 1223 (1986)). Brown stands for the view that the
source of an interspousal gift-that is, whether separate or marital funds were
used in acquiring the property-is not dispositive in determining whether the
gift is marital property, especially if the property is presently held in a tenancy
by the entireties. Brown, 352 Pa. Super. at 272-73. 507 A.2d at 1225-26. .-Icord
Blough v. Blough, 37 Pa. 1). & C.3d 423, 428 (1985); Clapper v. Clapper, 25 Pa.
1). & C.3d 467, 476 (1982). Conlra Seniasek, 331 Pa. Super. at 7, 479 A.2d at 1050
(source of finds with which gift purchased is relevant consideration).
78. 1988 )IVORCE CO)E, slp'ra note I, § 401 (d)(7).
726 [Vol. 34: p. 715
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property in the determination of equitable distribution.
79
Several other changes were made in the area of marital property.
First, under the 1988 Amendments, property acquired after final separa-
tion "in exchange for marital assets" is deemed marital property.,,)
Since, in most cases, property acquired shortly after separation is ac-
quired with marital assets, most property acquired between separation
and divorce can now arguably be classified as marital property. Second,
under the 1980 Code, proceeds received during marriage resulting from
a personal injury claim or other similar cause of action were character-
ized as marital property. 8 ' The 1988 Amendments change this by ad-
ding section 401(e)(8), which specifically provides that the time the
cause of action arises controls the characterization of the property, not
the time the damage payments are received. 82 Now, if the cause of ac-
tion accrues prior to final separation, the proceeds become marital prop-
erty. 83 Finally, in sections 401(e)(5) and 401(e)(7), the cutoff date
before which a good faith transfer or encumbrance will be classified as
separate property has been moved back to the date of final separation;
the original cutoff date was set at the commencement of the divorce
proceedings.8 4
E. Enforcement and Remedies
In an effort to add teeth to the new Divorce Code, enforcement
measures and available remedies were expanded. Section 401(g) gives
the court the power to "impose a lien or charge upon the property of a
party as security for the payment of alimony or any other award." '8 5 The
old law was less flexible, allowing only marital property to be subject to
a lien.8 61 Additionally, the court may award a party the right to live in the
79. Id.; see also PBI, 1988 Amendments, snpra note 3, at 23 (discussing impact
of § 401(d)(7)).
80. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(e)(1).
81. See Hurley v. Hurley, 342 Pa. Super. 156, 161,492 A.2d 439, 442 (1985)
(court held that although cause of action accrued prior to separation, since pay-
ment not made until after separation proceeds from cause of action are separate
property). Before the 1988 Amendments, no specific provision existed which
dealt with the status of proceeds from a lawsuit. Cases such as Hinlev, decided
prior to the Amendments, were decided under the more general category of
§ 401(e)(4) of the 1980 Code. 1980 DIvoRcE CODE, snpra note 1, § 401(e)(4)
(dealing with property acquired between separation and divorce).
82. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, snpra note 1, § 401(e)(8). The provision states:
"Any )avment received as a result of an award or settlement for any cause of
action or claim which accrued prior to the marriage or after the date of final
separation regardless of when the payment was received." Id. For a discussion
of the possible problems with § 401 (e)(8). see PBI, 1988.-imendmiens. spra note
3, at 24.
83. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, sit/l)a note 1, § 401 (e)(8).
84. Id. § 401(e)(5), (7).
85. Id. § 401(g).
86. 1980 DIVoRC: COD:, Sn/)a note I, § 4 01 (g). If a court only has the abil-
it' to impose a lien upon marital property, the dependent spouse may suffer
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marital residence, even during the pendency of the action.8 7 However,
it is important to note that an order granting or denying such pendente lite
relief is not appealable until final disposition of the case. 8
The 1988 Amendments also address the area of insurance. They
permit a court to not only require that a party continue existing life in-
surance coverage, but also to order an insured party to obtain health or
life insurance when it might be necessary to protect the interest of an-
other party.8 9 One possible application occurs when the payor spouse is
aged or in poor health and the dependent spouse can prove long-term
need. In such cases, life insurance effectively guarantees the equivalent
of continued support or alimony payment upon death of the payor
spouse.
Finally, the Pennsylvania legislature responded to the need for the
enforcement of equitable distribution orders and terms of a private sep-
aration agreement with a new section 401(k). 90 Many of the enforce-
ment measures contained in section 401(k) are simply adopted from
section 503, which deals with enforcement of alimony payments, or are
clarifications of the court's existing equitable powers.9 ' In addition,
three new measures are now available to the court: an award of counsel
fees and costs, 9 2 attachment of wages, 93 and the power to issue con-
tempt sanctions.9 4
because it normally takes a lengthy proceeding to determine what is marital
property. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 24. This slow process is not
conducive to effective enforcement. Additionally, this section now applies to
interim awards as well as final awards. Id.
87. See 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(b). This change codifies
and expands on the decision of Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154,
162, 496 A.2d 56, 60 (1985) (trial court may temporarily award marital resi-
dence to spouse with physical custody of minor child for reasonable time pe-
riod). Restrictions such as awarding the residence only to a spouse with a minor
child have been removed in § 401(h) of the 1988 Code. PBI, 1988 ,mntdments,
supra note 3, at 25.
88. PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 25 (citing Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa.
89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985)).
89. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(i). For a discussion of the ap-
plication of§ 401(i) of the 1980 Code, see Chaney v. Chaney, 343 Pa. Super. 77,
88, 493 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1985) (court had no power to order husband to desig-
nate wife as beneficiary of life insurance policy because policy purchased before
parties were married).
90. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, sUPra note 1, § 401(k).
91. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 27.
92. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, spra note I, § 401(k)(7). This section was added
to encourage parties to bring enforcement proceedings. PBI, 1988 .-1mendments,
snpra note 3, at 27.
93. 1988 DIVORCE ('ODE, snpra note 1, § 401(k)(8). See also PB1, 1988
Amendments, stnpn note 3, at 27 (citing Ankroni v. Ankrom, 3(56 Pa. Super. 461,
531 A.2d 509 (1987) (discussing propriety of attachniem of wages)).
94. 1988 )IVORCE D COlE, S1n/n note I, § 401(k) (9). For an example of a
case applying Contempt sanctions uider the 1980 Code, see Hopkinson v. Hop-
[Vol. 34: p. 715728
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F. Effect of Agreements
Prior to the enactment of the 1988 Amendments, Pennsylvania law
governing property settlement and separation agreements was in a state
of chaos9 5 Under the 1980 Code, unless the economic provisions of an
agreement, other than one for child support, were merged or incorpo-
rated by a court order, the enforcement of the agreement was left to a
private contract action. 96 Unfortunately, the distinction between an
agreement with an independent existence and one that has become
merged or incorporated into a decree became increasingly blurred as
courts tried to apply a rigid standard to problems which merited a more
flexible approach. 9 7
The 1988 Amendments have attempted to circumvent this problem
by eliminating the importance of merger and incorporation.9 8 Now,
"whether or not the agreement has been merged or incorporated into
the decree," a party may enforce the agreement as though it were a
court order, unless otherwise provided for in the agreement.9 9 It re-
mains unclear whether the converse is true-that is, whether an agree-
ment that is clearly incorporated may be nonetheless separately
enforced in a contract action. 100 The amendments also allow separation
kinson, 323 Pa. Super. 404, 470 A.2d 981 (1984), overruled by Sander v. Sander,
378 Pa. Super. 474, 549 A.2d 155 (1988).
95. See Kravetz v. Kravetz, 135 Pitts. L.J. 16, 18 & n.4 (1987) (more confu-
sion than clarity in area of separation agreements).
96. See Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 642,435 A.2d 859, 862 (1981) (separate
contract obligations survive agreement not merged into divorce decree). Accord
Madnick v. Madnick, 339 Pa. Super. 130, 133-34, 488 A.2d 344, 346 (1985).
97. The test for merger is the intent of the parties in light of the provisions
of the agreement. Millstein v. Millstein, 311 Pa. Super. 495, 506-07, 457 A.2d
1291, 1297 (1983). An exception to Millstein is found in Tokach v. Tokach, 326
Pa. Super. 359, 361-62, 474 A.2d 41, 42 (1984). The Tokach court held that if an
agreement is incorporated into the divorce decree by reference or in full, the
agreement and decree are merged. Id.
The next several appellate decisions in Pennsylvania attempted to circum-
vent the unworkable standard set forth in Tokach by distinguishing their facts
from that case. See McGough v. McGough, 361 Pa. Super. 391, 522 A.2d 638
(1987) (Tokach not applicable where agreement contains non-merger clause);
Casper v. Casper, 359 Pa. Super. 559, 565 n.6, 519 A.2d 493, 496 n.6 (1986)
(Tokach reasoning only applicable to child support agreements); Madnick v.
Madnick, 339 Pa. Super. 130, 133 n.l, 484 A.2d 344, 345 n.l (1985) (limits
Tokach to its facts, holding that support agreement entered as court order did
not merge).
98. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401.1 (a). For a comparable provi-
sion, see UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987)
(terms of agreement set forth in decree will be enforceable by contempt and
contract remedies). It should be noted that the 1988 Code only governs agree-
ments made after the Code's effective date. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note I,
§ 103.
99. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401.1(a).
100. See Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 640-41, 435 A.2d 859, 861-62 (1981)
(implying that once contract loses its independent existence by being merged or
incorporated into divorce decree, it cannot be enforced with contract remedies).
1989] 729
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agreements to be enforced by contempt orders. 10 1 This type of enforce-
ment may lead to unanticipated due process problems.'" 2
To retain maximum flexibility in the areas of child support, custody,
and visitation, the 1988 Amendments provide that these agreements
"shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of
changed circumstances."' 0 3 Presumably, this allows both upward and
downward modifications. Courts previously had held that child support
payment determinations could only be increased by a modification. 10 4
Because modification is available in the area of child support pay-
ments, litigants must rely on the courts to make sure parties do not in-
tentionally make unenforceable promises as to child support in
separation agreements. These promises could potentially be used as
bargaining chips in exchange for economic sacrifices by the other
party. '0 5 To prevent the use of modification as a weapon, judges must
prohibit modification when it appears that parties are claiming changed
circumstances in hopes of reducing their bargained-for obligation.
The uncertainty regarding subsequent modifications does not pres-
ent a problem as to separation agreements which deal only with ali-
mony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or expenses; these agreements
"shall not be subject to modification by the court" unless a specific pro-
vision allowing modification appears in the agreement.' 0" For some
time now, Pennsylvania courts have struggled to decide whether agree-
ments dealing with property and alimony should be modifiable regard-
less of their classification as incorporated into a decree or
independent. 10 7 The trend has been to prohibit modification because
101. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401(k)(9).
102. See Hollman v. Hollman, 347 Pa. Super. 289, 300, 500 A.2d 837, 842-
43 (1985). In Holtman, the court warned:
Were we to make the enforcement of support agreements equivalent to
the enforcement of support or alimony orders, then the full panoply of
enforcement means would become available, including jailing for con-
tempt. Thus, a person could be jailed on an obligation which never
passed the due process accorded to court orders and is not subject to
constant review for modification for change of circumstances or ability
to pay.
Id.
103. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401.1 (b).
104. See Millstein v. Millstein, 311 Pa. Super. 495, 501-02, 457 A.2d 1291,
1294 (1983) (separation agreement does not preclude court from increasing
child support obligation, but may preclude decreasing amount to less than pro-
vided for in agreement).
105. See Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 643-44, 435 A.2d 859, 863 (1981)
(modification or non-enforcement of separation agreements "would serve to ...
encourage a party to promise anything to obtain a divorce, knowing he will
never be bound by it, even when [with] ...valid consideration") (quoting
Brown v. Hall, 27 Cumb. L.J. 340, 349-50 (1977)).
106. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 401.1(c).
107. Compare Lee v. Lee, 352 Pa. Super. 241, 245, 507 A.2d 862, 864 (1986)
(alimony order pursuant to agreement of parties subject to modification by court
730 [Vol. 34: p. 715
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practically "every provision is bargained for as part of a whole." "l This
non-modification provision will protect the integrity of separation agree-
ments and the expectations of the parties involved, perhaps at the risk of
a payor spouse with genuinely changed circumstances being unable to
reduce his or her obligation.
G. Injunctions, Inventories, and Valuation Dates
The next set of changes involves section 403(a), 10 9 a provision orig-
inally designed to prevent the disposition of property in order to defeat
either alimony or child support. I I Section 403(a) has been expanded
to prohibit transfers which could defeat equitable distribution.I'
In a further effort to protect the dependent spouse, the legislature
has expanded the inventory and appraisal requirements of section
403(b).' 12 These inventory and appraisal requirements are now signifi-
cantly more detailed.' 13 The old inventory rules required a party to set
in event of substantial changed circumstances) with Fleming v. Fleming, 130
Pitts. L.J. 68, 70-71 (1982) (regardless of whether alimony and equitable distri-
bution agreement is merged into decree, it will be non-modifiable in absence of
modification clause). For a discussion of the modification issue, see PBI, 1988
Amendments, supra note 3, at 29.
108. Fleming, 130 Pitts. L.J. at 71. See also Stanley v. Stanley, 339 Pa. Super.
118, 488 A.2d 338 (1985) (adopting rationale in Fleming); Vankirk v. Vankirk,
336 Pa. Super. 502, 505, 485 A.2d 1194, 1196 (1984) (court must construe sepa-
ration agreement only as written and may not modify plain meaning of words)
(citations omitted).
109. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(a). Section 403(a) states:
Where it appears to the court that a party is about to remove himself or
herself or his or her property from the jurisdiction of the court or is
about to dispose of, alienate, or encumber property in order to defeat
equitable distribution, alimony pendente lite, alimony, child and
spousal support, or similar award, an injunction may issue to prevent
such removal or disposition and such property may be attached as pro-
vided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court may also issue a writ
of ne exeat to preclude such removal.
Id.
110. See id. (protecting only against transfers designed to defeat alimony or
child support).
11. Id. (protecting against transfers designed to defeat equitable distribu-
tion, alimony, or child support). This provision codifies the decision in Lazovitz
v. Lazovitz, 307 Pa. Super. 341, 351, 453 A.2d 615, 619-20 (1982) (1980 Code
grants courts power to enjoin acts which defeat party's rights to equitable distri-
bution of property).
112. Section 403(b) requires that parties "submit to the court an inventory
and appraisement" containing information specified therein. 1988 DIVORCE
CODE, supra note 1, § 403(b). Failure to comply with § 403(b) of the 1988
Amendments will result in a variety of sanctions which were available under the
1980 Code. See PA. R. Civ. P. 4019, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987)
(governing present sanctions). For an example of a court imposing statutory
sanctions, see Box v. Box, 25 Pa. D. & C.3d 219 (1983) (master may sanction
party for noncompliance by refusing to consider assets disclosed in untimely
inventory).
113. Section 403(b) of the 1980 Code did not provide details as to the type
17
Sottosanti: For Better or Worse: The 1988 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Divo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
out his or her marital and separate property; the new rules do not afford
a party the luxury of characterizing his or her own assets.' 
14
Parties must now also identify and value property acquired between
final separation and thirty days before a property hearing.' 15 This re-
quirement reflects the change made in section 401(e)(4)' and will aid
courts in determining whether marital funds were used in the acquisi-
tion of property for purposes of classifying the property as separate or
marital. Section 403(b) requires each party to submit a list of all prop-
erty held and its value at three relevant dates: acquisition, separation,
and thirty days prior to the equitable distribution hearing date. 1 17 By
adopting some of the judicial changes imposed on the valuation system
of the 1980 Code, section 403(b) will enable a court to choose a valua-
tion date which will achieve economic justice between the parties.' I"
The 1988 Code thus attempts a more systematic and realistic approach
to valuation of assets. Practitioners should first consult the section
403(b) framework to find what dates are relevant in a given situation and
then use supporting case law to appeal to the court's discretion as to
which particular date should be applied.
of inventory and appraisement required. See 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1,
§ 403(b). The requirements of the inventory and appraisement form were origi-
nally contained in PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.33, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
1987). The effect of Rule 1920.33 has been modified by the changes in § 403(b)
of the 1988 Code.
114. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.33, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987)
(allowing parties to characterize their assets as marital or separate). Now, courts
will perform the necessary characterization.
115. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(b)(1)-(2).
116. Id. § 401(e)(4). For a discussion of § 401(e)(4) of the 1988 Code, see
supra note 81 and accompanying text.
117. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(b). Before the 1988 Amend-
ments, the Divorce Code contained no express provision governing the selec-
tion of a date to be used for valuation of marital property for purposes of
equitable distribution.
For examples of decisions prior to the 1988 Amendments where courts
struggled to find the proper date for valuation, see Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. 378,
382, 543 A.2d 534, 536 (1988) (indicating preference for valuation at time of
distribution because of considerable time passage between date of separation
and date of distribution); Diamond v. Diamond, 360 Pa. Super. 101, 112, 519
A.2d 1012, 1017 (1987) (court uses separation date for valuation where increase
in value of marital assets attributable to husband's post-separation efforts); Bold
v. Bold, 358 Pa. Super. 7, 15, 516 A.2d 741, 744 (1986) (court uses closest possi-
ble date, master's hearing, for valuation of marital home). See also Sergi v. Sergi,
351 Pa. Super. 588, 593-94, 506 A.2d 928, 931 (1986). In Sergi, the court dis-
cussed the pros and cons of using either the date of trial or the separation date
as the date for valuation of marital property. Id. The Seigi court determined that
the trial court must have the discretion to choose between these two dates. Id. at
594, 506 A.2d at 932.
118. 1988 DIvoRcE CODE, supra note 1, § 102(a)(6) (effects of "economic
justice" stated policy of Pennsylvania legislature).
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H. Discovery
The 1980 Code provided for structured and limited use of discov-
ery devices and the use of discovery devices other than interrogatories
required special leave of the court.' 9 Section 403(b.1) 120 of the 1988
Code now permits use of the full range of discovery devices available in
other civil actions under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.' 2 '
The effect of the new discovery rules on the duration of a divorce pro-
ceeding is unclear. Although attorneys no longer need to spend time
petitioning the court for special permission to depose a party,' 2 2 the
pre-trial discovery process may be lengthened in the absence of court
supervision as attorneys attempt to use discovery as a delay tactic. The
expanded discovery options will make more information available to
parties and their attorneys, which will help them to better comply with
other provisions of the 1988 Code. 12 3 However, the liberalized discov-
ery rules may also provide a vehicle for harassment or unnecessary "fish-
ing expeditions." To prevent this, judges must be willing to deter abuse
by sanctioning irresponsible parties and their attorneys. 124
I. Alimony and Support
Significant changes were made in Chapter Five, which governs ali-
mony and support. The 1988 Amendments eliminate "palimony" suits
from the purview of this section by requiring a divorce decree before a
119. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1920.22, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987) (no
discovery allowed except timely interrogatories limited to areas related to ali-
mony or property distribution unless authorized by special court order); id. Rule
1915.13 (court has discretion to provide for special relief to allow greater dis-
covery than under rule 1920.22); see also Newborn v. Newborn, 44 Pa. D. & C.3d
52 (1987) (party seeking leave of court for discovery must show material sought
is essential for just determination of rights and not easily acquired through in-
ventory requirements or by interrogatories).
120. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(b.1).
121. Id. This provision states: "Discovery under this act shall be as pro-
vided for all other civil actions under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." Id.
122. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 31 Ches. C. Rep. 509, 510-11 (1983) (counsel
had to first submit to court detailed outline of areas to be examined at
deposition).
123. See, e.g., 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 403(b) (inventory re-
quirements); id. § 401 (e) (relevant dates for determination of marital or separate
property).
124. PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 32-33 (referring to 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2503(7) (Purdon 1981) and use of formal discovery sanctions as
possible methods of deterring dilatory or abusive discovery). Section 2503(7)
authorizes judges to impose sanctions of attorney's fees against litigants for "dil-
atory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(7)
(Purdon 1981). Additionally, formal discovery sanctions are available for dis-
covery proceedings conducted for the purpose of delay or for those made in bad
faith. Id. § 4019(h).
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court may consider an award of alimony.'12 5
The legislature also made changes in the factors to be considered in
determining alimony. Two of the factors were moved from section
501(a) to section 501(b). 12' This move was in response to a recent
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision which interpreted these two fac-
tors as creating a threshold test for alimony. 12 7 The amendment
reverses the "threshold" interpretation by making these two factors sim-
ply two more items to be considered in the section 501 (b) "laundry list"
of factors for determining the necessity, duration and amount of
alimony.
1. The Determination of Alimony
The language of several of the factors to be considered in determin-
ing alimony was changed and several new factors were added. Under
the 1980 Code, courts could only consider "[t]he extent to which it
would be inappropriate for a party, because [the] party will be custodian
of a minor child, to seek employment outside the home."' 128 The 1988
COde is more comprehensive because it allows courts to consider how
having custody of a minor child will affect a custodial parent's earning
power, expenses and financial obligations. 12' ) The 1988 Amendments
also make it clear that the "federal, state and local tax ramifications of
the alimony award" will be considered by the court when shaping the
alimony award.13 0 The final two factors added to section 501 (b) consist
of the factors which were deleted from section 501(a). 13 1
125. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(a).
126. These factors were: (1) whether a party lacked enough property for
that party's reasonable needs; and (2) whether the party lacked the ability to
support his or her self through appropriate employment. 1980 DIVORCE CODE,
supra note 1, § 501(a). These factors are now found at § 501(b)(16), (17) of the
1988 code. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(16), (17).
127. See Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986). In deciding
how to "split" an advanced degree earned by one of the parties to a divorce, the
Hodge court found that the factors listed in § 501(a) of the 1980 Code were rele-
vant to a determination of entitlement for alimony, while the other factors found
in § 501(b) were relevant only for determining amount, duration and manner of
payment. Id. at 271-72, 520 A.2d at 18. Decisions prior to Hodge had rejected
the "threshold" interpretation. See Bickley v. Bickley, 301 Pa. Super. 396, 406,
447 A.2d 1025, 1031 (1982) (all factors for alimony are to be considered to-
gether); accord Hess v. Hess, 327 Pa. Super. 279, 287, 475 A.2d 796, 800-01
(1984). For a further discussion of the controversy surrounding whether a
threshold test existed for alimony entitlement, see PBI, 1988 Amendments, s1pra
note 3, at 37.
128. See 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(7).
129. 1988 DIvORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(b)(7).
130. Id. § 501(b)(15). This codifies the holding in Reisinger v. Reisinger,
324 Pa. Super. 223, 227, 471 A.2d 544, 546 (1984) (amount of award should
consider actual post-tax net incomes). For a discussion of how tax considera-
tions may effect equitable distribution, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501 (b). For a discussion of these
factors, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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2. The Duration of Alimony
In one of the most far-reaching provisions of the 1988 Amend-
ments, the language in the 1980 Code limiting duration of alimony was
dropped in favor of a flexible "reasonableness" standard. 132 Before the
enactment of the Divorce Code in 1980, Pennsylvania was in the minor-
ity of states not providing for an award of alimony following divorce. 133
The 1980 Code allowed alimony only for a time period sufficient to en-
able the dependent spouse to become self-supporting. 134 The Penn-
sylvania courts characterized this type of alimony as "rehabilitative
alimony."13 5 Prior to the 1988 Amendments, Pennsylvania courts could
only overstep the time limits inherent in rehabilitative alimony in
instances where rehabilitation would be impossible due to practical limi-
tations such as poor health or advanced age. 136 The new "reasonable-
ness" standard enables courts to be more flexible than was possible
under the enumerated exceptions found in section 501(c) of the 1980
Code.
The framework of the 1980 Code for determining the duration of
alimony has been abandoned, but it is submitted that any fears that the
1988 Amendments will usher in an era of permanent alimony for every-
one is unfounded. The new standard of "reasonableness" will accom-
plish an important purpose. It will serve to expand the meaning of
"rehabilitative alimony" by allowing courts to examine more than sim-
ply a few factors and exceptions when they determine the duration of
alimony. 137 The reasonableness standard also allows alimony in certain
132. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(c) ("The court in ordering
alimony shall determine the duration of the order, which may be for a definite or
an indefinite period of time which is reasonable under the circumstances.").
133. See Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. 178, 189, 492 A.2d 707, 713
(1985) (citing Gold-Bikin & Rounick, supra note 2).
134. See 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(c). The 1980 Code pro-
vided that the court "shall limit the duration of the [alimony] order to a period
of time which is reasonable for the purpose of allowing the party seeking ali-
mony to meet his or her reasonable needs by: (1) obtaining appropriate employ-
ment; or (2) developing an appropriate employable skill." Id.
135. See, e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 271, 520 A.2d 15, 18 (1986)
(purpose of Pennsylvania statute is rehabilitation, not reimbursement); Pacella v.
Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. 178, 189, 492 A.2d 707, 713 (1985) (same); Lehmicke v.
Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 567, 489 A.2d 782, 786 (1985) ("our statute pro-
vides only for 'rehabilitative alimony' ").
136. See 1980 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 501(c) (providing exception
for time restrictions of rehabilitation alimony where impediments to gainful em-
ployment such as age, physical, mental, or emotional condition, or custody of a
minor child exist); see also Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. at 189, 492 A.2d at 713 (when
rehabilitation not possible because of age, health, or other circumstances, ali-
mony may be continued past rehabilitative date); Eck v. Eck, 327 Pa. Super. 334,
339-40, 475 A.2d 825, 827-28 (1984) (lack of experience,job skills, or education
may prevent gainful employment for purposes of § 501(c)).
137. These factors under the 1980 Code were found at 1980 DIVORCE
CODE, supra note 1, § 501(c).
1989]
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new situations in order to effectuate economic equality. This concept is
known as reimbursement alimony, and was flatly rejected by Penn-
sylvania courts prior to the enactment of the amendments. ' 38 The para-
digm case where reimbursement alimony may now be awarded is in
"threshold degree" cases where the spouse requesting alimony would
have been ineligible for both rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony
under the 1980 Code.1'
3 9
Another section was added which deals with the effect upon the
continuation of alimony payments. When the payee party dies, "the
right to receive alimony pursuant to [Chapter Five] shall cease."' 140
When the payor party dies "the obligation to pay alimony shall cease
unless otherwise indicated in an agreement between the parties or an
order of court."' 14 1 The 1988 Amendments allow a court to order ali-
mony beyond the payor's life, in recognition that there are situations
where it would be inequitable for alimony payments to cease at a certain
time. 142
The legislature has now given courts the power to extend the dura-
138. See Hodge, 513 Pa. at 271-72, 520 A.2d at 19 (trial court erroneously
attempted to effectuate economic equality through use of alimony).
139. See PBI, 1988 Amendments, supra note 3, at 36. A "threshold degree"
case is one where the supporting spouse recently received an advanced degree,
often through the help of the now dependent spouse. In these cases the parties
have accumulated little marital property by the time of separation. Thus, the
dependent spouse cannot be reimbursed out of the marital property for contri-
butions made to the supporting spouse's education. See Lehmicke v. Lehmicke,
339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985). In many of these cases, the dependent
spouse did not qualify for rehabilitative alimony because he or she could ade-
quately provide for himself or herself. In addition, the dependent spouse could
not even hope to share in the increased earning capacity of the supporting
spouse. See Hodge, 513 Pa. at 269, 520 A.2d at 17 (increased earning capacity as
result of professional license does not come within definition of "marital prop-
erty" for purposes of division). This leads to an unfair situation where depen-
dent spouses are unable to see any benefits from their sacrifices. The
"reasonable needs ... under the circumstances" language in § 501(c) of the
1988 Amendments may rectify such situations.
140. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 508. See PBI, 1988 Amendments,
supra note 3, at 40-41 (comparing language of § 508 to language of several sec-
tions of Federal Tax Code).
141. 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 508. This new section codifies
existing case law and adds a new twist. In Chaney v. Chaney, 343 Pa. Super. 77,
86, 493 A.2d 1382, 1387 (1985), the court found that the only way for an award
of alimony to extend past a payor's death is by an agreement between the par-
ties. Section 508 of the 1988 Code allows for alimony to continue past the
payor's death by an agreement between the parties or an order of the court.
1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note I, § 508.
Section 508 of the 1988 Code is unclear as to when a trial court may make
an order extending alimony past the payor's death. This decision could be made
either during the divorce proceedings or the court could wait until the time of
the payor's death to make such an order.
142. See 1988 DIvoRcE CODE, SUpr note 1, § 508; see also id. § 501(c) (dura-
tion of alimony may be for definite or indefinite period of time).
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tion of alimony in two separate provisions.'14 3 Read together, these two
sections will extend the amount of time a payor spouse, and possibly his
or her estate, must support a dependent spouse when the circumstances
so dictate.
III. CONCLUSION
The 1988 Amendments represent a major overhaul of the 1980 Di-
vorce Code, which had taken Pennsylvania out of the dark ages in the
area of domestic relations.' 44 These Amendments have built on and
refined much of the 1980 Code. It appears that the 1988 Code has sev-
eral objectives: (1) to enable the Divorce Code to be flexible enough to
deal with "the realities of the matrimonial experience;"' 45 (2) to elimi-
nate overtechnical approaches and interpretations of the 1980 Code
which lengthened the duration of a marital dissolution proceeding;' 4 6
(3) to provide more meaningful information to both parties to aid them
in making informed decisions in the economic matters associated with
the dissolution of marriage;' 4 7 and (4) to clarify and simplify difficult
concepts which the legislature thought it was better suited to handle
than the courts. 1
48
143. Id. §§ 501(c), 508. Section 501(c) is an attempt to expand prior no-
tions of rehabilitative alimony. For a discussion of this change, see supra notes
132-39 and accompanying text.
144. See Sinha v. Sinha, 515 Pa. 14, 17, 526 A.2d 765, 766 (1987) (betore
1980 Code was adopted, Pennsylvania's divorce laws were essentially unchanged
since 1785).
145. See 1988 DIVORCE CODE, supra note 1, § 102(a)(1) (legislative intent).
The 1988 Code attempts to address marital realities by clarifying such issues as
"separate and apart," extending the duration for alimony, and by adding new
considerations for the determination of alimony and equitable distribution. For
a discussion of "separate and apart," see supra notes 11-16. For a discussion of
the duration of alimony, see supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the determination of alimony, see supra notes 128-31 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the determination of equitable distribution, see
supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
146. The 1988 Code attempts to speed up a potentially painful dissolution
process through § 201(d)(1), which allows parties to avoid amending com-
plaints, and § 201(e) which precludes hearings on fault grounds when no-fault
grounds are established. For a discussion of § 201(d)(l), see supra notes 17-24
and accompanying text. For a discussion of § 201(e), see supra notes 29-33 and
accompanying text.
147. The 1988 Code attempts to provide more information to the parties
through § 403(b), which outline more comprehensive inventory requirements.
and § 403(b.1), which allows greater discovery rights. 1988 1I)ORCF. CODE,
supra note 1, § 403(b), (b. i). For a discussion of the inventory requirements, see
supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of discov\er in do-
mestic relations, see supra notes 119-24 and accomjpanying text.
148. Prior to the enactment of the 1988 Amendments, Pennsylvania courts
struggled with the areas of marital property, separation agreements. and the
time for valuation of marital property. For a discussion of the classification of
marital property, see supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text. For it discussion
of separation agreements, see supra note 95-108 and accompanying text. For a
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The 1988 Amendments have yet to be extensively tested by litiga-
tion, but the objectives are laudable and provide a solid basis for courts
and future legislatures to build upon. These amendments were long-
awaited and necessary. Only time will tell what impact they have on the
delicate area of family law. For now it is safe to say that the changes
attempt to usher in the modern era of domestic relations where the main
goals are the effect of economic justice and mitigation of harm to all
parties involved in marital dissolutions.
Carl Soltosanti
discussion of when to assess a value to marital property, see supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
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